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FORCING INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE ON
UNMARRIED COHABITANTS: THE AMERICAN




The most important recent development in the areas addressed
by the Marvin' decision is the approval last year and impending publi-
cation of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution.2 The Principles' treatment of relationships between "do-
mestic partners"3 and of partners' agreements4 to modify the financial
consequences that would othervise follow from the termination of
their relationships must reflect a profound distrust for individuals' ef-
forts to set the terms for intimate relationships to meet their owvn
needs. Instead, the Pinciples would generally mandate for them the
same rights and obligations for division of marital property and ali-
mony (renamed "compensatory spousal payments") that the Principles
would create on dissolution of marriage.5 Although analysis of chap-
* John L. Gray Professor of Law & Carl F. Schipper, Jr., Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School. A.B. 1947, University of Missouri; LL.B. 1950, Harard Law
School. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Charles
Donahue,Jr., Mary Ann Glendon, RobertJ. Levy, Peter L Murmy,John Sheldon, and
Harry Tindall. Jeremy A. Younkin, of the Harvard Law School Class of 2002, provided
excellent research assistance.
1 Marvin v. Marvin, 537 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
2 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAM[LY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECO.MFtNtDA.
TIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PWCaPcrLES (Tentative Draft
2000)1. The Principles were approved by the members of the American Law Institute
at its annual meeting. As the final version of the Prindples was not available when this
Essay went to press, unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to Prnciples are
to Tentative Draft No. 4.
3 See id. §§ 6.01-.06.
4 See id §§ 7.01-.18.
5 These claims relate both to the division of property on dissolution and com-
pensatory spousal payments. The principal provisions dealing with these topics are
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ters dealing with those matters is outside the scope of this Essay,6 their
animating impetus is clear: to enhance and safeguard the rights of
dependent spouses and cohabitants and to diminish the possibility
that those rights may be reduced or eliminated by an agreement of
the parties.
If there were any persuasive reason to believe that the Principles
actually reflected the views of a substantial majority of the almost
three thousand distinguished judges, lawyers, and law teachers who
are members of the American Law Institute, I would hesitate to write a
critical essay.7 In fact, however, there is no way to know whether the
Principles reflect the views of more than a minor fraction of the mem-
bership. Although the Institute's Bylaws require authorization by the
membership and approval by the Council for publication of any work
as representing the Institute's position,8 "[a] quorum for any session
of a meeting of the members is established by registration during the
meeting of one-fifth of the voting members."9 Thus, the quorum re-
quirement is satisfied for all sessions of the meeting as soon as one-
fifth have registered, even though the number of members present
and voting at a given session is substantially smaller. A majority voting
on any question "is effective as action of the membership,"' 0 and the
Bylaws make no provision for proxy voting. As a result, fundamental
matters of policy may be decided by the votes by only a small part of
the membership. For example, a motion to recommit a proposed sec-
tion in Chapter 4 that would recharacterize individual property as
marital property on the basis of the passage of time, and thereby sub-
ject such property to division by the parties on dissolution of their
marriage, was defeated at the 1995 meeting by a vote of only 101 to
included in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REcOMMEN-
DATIONS chs. 4-5 (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINcinLES
(Proposed Final Draft 1997)], although minor revisions of both chapters are included
in the recent tentative draft. See AL PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2,
at 61, 353.
6 For comments on earlier drafts of these chapters, seeJ. Thomas Oldham, ALI
Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 801.
7 I should acknowledge my own miniscule role in the "Members Consultative
Group" for the Pinciples. After one meeting, it became clear to me that the Group
and the Reporters were marching to a very different beat and that my efforts to alter
their views would be futile. I tried again at the May 2000 Annual Meeting, introduc-
ing three motions to amend chapters six and seven, but they were all defeated by
voice votes.
8 See ALl, 2000 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE INSTrrUTE, Bylaw § 6.01, at 61, 64
(2000).
9 Id. § 3.02, at 61, 62.
10 Id. § 3.04, at 61, 64.
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95."1 Thus, although the Principles represents the official position of
the ALI, it may not reflect the views of even a substantial minority of
the membership.
In joining a growing chorus of critics of other recent work of the
Institute,' 2 I do not suggest, as some have of other Institute projects,
that the Principles are overly. responsive to the concerns of a particular
self-interested constituency. Nor can the Principles be faulted, as was a
recent Reporter's Study, for becoming "mired in technical detail and
overly cautious.' u 3 Indeed, the Reporters have not hesitated to sweep
with a broad brush and to recommend wholesale departures from the
developing law.
Although one of the stated objectives of the Principles is to allow
the parties to "accommodate their particular needs and circum-
stances," 14 this welcoming overture is severely limited by the caveat
that follows: "subject to constraints that recognize competing policy
concerns and limitations in the capacity of parties to appreciate ade-
quately, at the time of the agreement, the impact of its terms under
different life circumstances." 15 Adoption of this restrictive approach
would run counter to a growing willingness of courts and legislatures
to empower couples to structure their intimate relationships to reflect
their individual needs. Moreover, applying the same standard of re-
view to agreements between nonmarital cohabitants and prospective
spouses flies in the face of a fundamental difference between the ways
in which the rights and obligations of the parties are established in
these sharply contrasting situations.
Prospective spouses who agree to modify the rights and obliga-
tions that they would otherwise incur surely know, at least in general
terms, that such rights and obligations are created the moment the
parties marry, although the state law that will ultimately define those
rights and obligations is largely determined by where they spend their
11 See 72 ALI, ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS 128, 142 (1995).
12 See, e.g., Alex Elson & Michael L. Shakinan, The ALT Prindpkes of Corporate Gov-
ernance: A Tainted Process and a Flawed Product, 49 Bus. L-,w. 1761 (1994); Monroe H.
Freedman, Caveat Lector Conflicts of Interest of ALl Menmbers in Drafting the Restatements,
26 HorsTRA L. REv. 641 (1998); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling SharcholderRights and Strike
Suits in Derivative Litigation: TheALIDrops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1339 (1993); Frank
J. Vandall, The American Law Institute Is Dead in the Water, 26 Horsrmx L RE%. 801, 802
(1998) (asserting the RESFATcEMNT (THIRD) OF ToRrs: PRODUCTS L. tL.n" § 2(b)
"reads like a wish list for manufacturing America").
13 Jeffrey O'Connell & Chad M. Oldfather, A Lost Opportunity: A Review oftheAmer-
ican Law Institute' Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 30 S:.%
DIEGO L. REv. 307, 307 (1993).
14 ALI PRINcIPLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.02.
15 Id.
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married life. In contrast, nonmarital cohabitants may fail to realize
not only that their relationship carries the potential for major legal
consequences, but also that their existence and extent depends both
on which state's law governs and on the way in which their relation-
ship develops. Nevertheless, the Principles would impose obligations
on many cohabitants which could be avoided only by an express
agreement that satisfies requirements identical to those applicable for
agreements between prospective spouses. 16 Imposing marital obliga-
tions on parties in an informal relationship is wholly at odds with
some of the potentially liberating implications of the Marvin court's
decision.
I. CoHABITANTs' CoNTRAG'rs AND CLIs AFTER MARVIN
In Marvin, the California Supreme Court was explicit in recogniz-
ing cohabitants' contractual capacity:
In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults
who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are
nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respect-
ing their earnings and property rights. Of course, they cannot law-
fully contract to pay for the performance of sexual services .... 17
Unfortunately, the court followed with qualifying language that may
be read to constrict cohabitants' contractual freedom. It quoted from
a prior dissenting opinion admonishing the court to presume "that
the parties intend to deal fairly with each other"18 and to inquire into
the parties' "conduct"'19 and "the nature of their relationship."20 Both
caveats are troubling.
"Fairness" has an intuitive appeal as a touchstone to resolve con-
tractual ambiguities. The courts' response to extreme unfairness,
even in the absence of ambiguity, is reflected in the doctrine of "un-
cohscionability" as a basis for refusing to enforce particular contract
16 See infra notes 83-85.
17 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976). The Martin opinion has been
the subject of many comments. For a particularly thoughtful analysis of its possible
implications, see Herma Hill Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Op-
tions, 65 CAt.. L. REv. 937 (1977). See also Christina M. Femindez, Note, Beyond Mar-
vin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. REV. 359, 363 (1978) (suggesting
that the next development in de facto marriage property settlement should allow for
support payments); Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabila.
tion: Marvin v. Marvin, 90 H~ARv. L. REv. 1708, 1714 (1977) (arguing Marvin will
"mak[e] cohabitation a more attractive and flexible arrangement").
18 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
19 Id. at 110.
20 Id. at 117 n.11.
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terms or even an entire agreement.2 1 However, reliance on unfairness
that falls short of unconscionability as justification for revising con-
tracts, or refusing to enforce them, may lead to a wholesale interfer-
ence with private contracting because of wide ranging judicial
perceptions of what is "fair."22 Indeed, the disturbing consequences
of unbridled judicial discretion in this area are illustrated by the sub-
sequent history of the Marvin case on remand. The trial court, appar-
ently relying in part on the statement of the California Supreme Court
that its opinion "does not preclude the evolution of additional equita-
ble remedies to protect the expectations of the parties,"a3 aw-arded
Michelle Marvin $104,000 for her economic "rehabilitation."2 4 How-
ever, the California Court of Appeal reversed the award, holding that
it went beyond the issues framed by the pleadings.2 That court also
relied on the trial court's findings that Michelle Marvin benefited so-
cially and economically from the relationship, that Lee Marvin never
had an obligation to pay for her maintenance, and that he was not
unjustly enriched.2 6
The findings just referred to illustrate the objectionable conse-
quences of the inquiry directed by the California Supreme Court into
the parties' "conduct" and "the nature of their relationship." In addi-
tion to the subjective nature of the decision-making that such an in-
quiry invites, it can be both highly intrusive ,and financially
burdensome for litigants. A critical comment by Professor Daiid
Chambers on the Marvin decision points out that the eleven-week trial
generated 8000 pages of transcript, which included allegations of an
affair between Michelle Marvin and another man and testimony con-
cerning that man's alleged homosexual orientation, which he offered
witnesses to rebut 2 7 Chambers suggests that the decision invites the
kinds of testimony about infidelity and abuse that the change to no-
fault divorce sought to eliminate.28 He suggests that the court should
have limited enforcement to express written agreements and should
21 See U.C.C. § 2-302 .(1989); RSTAEMItENT (SECOND) OF COa-riuc.rs § 208 (1981).
22 See David L. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Polic" of Support-
ive Neutrality, 18 U. Mic. J.L. RE o t 805, 824 (1985).
23 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25; sceMarvin v.N Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558 (Ct.
App. 1981) (noting that the trial court seemed to have based its judgment on foot-
notes twenty-five and twent)-six).
24 larvin v. Marvin, 5 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077, 3085 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1979),
rev'd, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1981).
25 Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
26 Id. at 559.
27 Chambers, supra note 22, at 825.
28 Seeid.
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not have recognized implied contracts or created new equitable
remedies.2 9
The variety of remedies the Marvin court offered cohabitants is
indeed broad.
The courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to deter-
mine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or im-
plied agreement of partnership orjoint venture, or some other tacit
understanding between the parties. The courts may, when appro-
priate, employ principles of constructive trust or resulting trust. Fi-
nally, a nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable
value of support received if he can show that he rendered services
with the expectation of monetary reward.30
Of course, imposition of a resulting trust where one cohabitant con-
tributes funds toward the acquisition of property held by the other
cohabitant 3' is merely an application in the context of cohabitation of
general trust doctrine.3 2
A vivid illustration of the kind of detailed inquiry into the most
intimate aspects of cohabitants' lives that may result from assimilating
nonmarital cohabitation to marriage is provided by a recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Washington, In re Marriage of Penninglon.33
Although the case name refers to "marriage," the opinion in fact deals
with two cases filed by females against their male cohabitants seeking
to establish in each instance a "meretricious relationship"34 so as to be
entitled to a share of property accumulated while the relationship
29 Id. at 826. Another commentator has suggested that written agreements not
only obviate many of the problems of proof that arise when a claim is based on an oral
contract, but may also lead couples to consider more carefully the possible conse-
quences of the dissolution of their cohabitation arrangement. See Twila L. Perry, Dis-
solution Planning in Family Law: A Critique of Current Analyses and a Look Toward the
Future 24 FAM. L.Q. 77, 116-18 (1990).
30 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23 (Cal. 1976) (citations omitted).
31 SeeJ. THOMAS OLDHAm, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DisriBmUIION OF PRoI',
ER-r § 1.02(5) (c) (2001).
32 See 5 AusrwN WAYEMAN Scotrr & WIUiAM FRANKUN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTs § 440.1 (4th ed. 1987).
33 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000).
34 In this context, Washington gives "meretricious relationship" an unusual
meaning. Compare the definition in Black's Law Dictionary: "1. Involving prostitu-
tion; of an unlawful sexual nature <a meretricious encounter>. 2. (Of a romantic
relationship) involving either two people of the same sex or lack of capacity on the
part of one party <a meretricious marriage>...." BLAcK's LAW DIcnoNARY 1002 (7th
ed. 1999).
[VOL- 76:r)1472
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continued.3 5 Washington is one of the few states whose courts have
discretion, when cohabitation that satisfies the requirements for such
a relationship ends, to divide acquisitions from earnings while it
continued. 36
After an exhaustive review of the facts of both cases, the Pen-
nington court held that neither satisfied the requirements for a "mere-
tricious relationship,"37 which the court had characterized in a prior
decision as a "stable, marital-like relationship where both parties co-
habit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not
exist."3 8 The court listed five factors to be considered in making the
determination: continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship,
purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services forjoint
projects, and intent of the parties.3 9
Examining these factors can lead to close scrutiny of the intimate
details of the parties' lives. In one case, the parties' relationship
spanned twelve years, but the male partner was married to someone
else for the first five years and the parties' cohabitation included peri-
ods of separation, during one of which the female partner was living
with another man.4 ° The court found that the evidence did not sup-
port the conclusion that the parties had "the mutual intent to form a
meretricious relationship."4 1
Although the Principles refer to "domestic partnership," rather
than "meretricious relationship," the definition would sometimes per-
mit the same kind of detailed inquiry into the most intimate aspects of
35 See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). For a
critical comment on the decision, see Gavin M. Parr, iTat Is a "Mferde-iious Relation-
ship"?: An Analysis of Cohabitant Propery Rights Under Connell v. Francisco, 74 Wsti. L
REV. 1243 (1999).
36 Other decisions relying on a status approach in distributing cohabitants' prop-
erty after a long-term relationship include 1ilburv. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or.
Ct. App. 1993), and Shuraleffv. Donnely, 817 P.2d 764, 768 (Or. Ct App. 1991). Simi-
lar results were reached in Pickens v. Pidzns, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986). In other
cases, courts have relied on constructive trust doctrine to award a cohabitant a prop-
erty interest. See, e.g., Evans v. Wall, 542 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Sulli-
van v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass. 1989). Citations for foreign jurisdictions that
have reached similar results by including cohabitants, including same-sex partners, in
the definition of spouse, are collected in ALI PRiNciP._s (Tentative Draft 2000), supra
note 2, § 6.03 Reporter's Notes.
37 Pennington, 14 P.3d at 773.
38 Id. at 770 (quoting Conne/, 898 P.2d at 834).
39 Id.
40' Id. at 771.
41 Id. A significant factor in the court's determination that no mutual intent to
be in a meretricious relationship existed was that, while the female cohabitant insisted
on marrying, the male cohabitant refused. Id.
20011 1473
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the partners' lives42 to serve as a basis for treating the end of the rela-
tionship as if it were the dissolution of a marriage without regard to
whether the partners had made the express written agreement Profes-
sor Chambers would require.43 Of course, the reality probably is that
express agreements between nonmarital cohabitants are relatively
rare and usually are made for the purpose of negating, rather than
defining, any rights based on the relationship.44 Thus, if recovery is
allowed only if such an agreement is made, most cohabitants probably
will not have a legally enforceable claim when the relationship ends,
or when one of the parties dies, unless it ripens into marriage. On the
other hand, the reality also is that many marriages today are preceded
by nonmarital cohabitation. If potential cohabitants become fearful
that marital rights and obligations may attach, whether or not they
marry, relationships that would have enriched the lives of both parties
and that might have led to marriage may never be given a chance to
develop.
An appealing case for statutory recognition of a right to recovery
in the absence of any agreement providing for it is where one cohabi-
tant pays for the education or training of the other. In the context of
dissolution of marriage, the Principles would, under specified circum-
stances, award a spouse compensation for contributions to the other
spouse's education or training,45 and similar treatment may be appro-
priate for cohabitants who do not make an agreement dealing with
the effect, if any, of such contributions.
A. Responses by Legislatures and Courts to Marvin
Responses by some legislatures and courts since Marvin
was decided reflect serious concerns about the potential im-
plications of the opinion. 46 Two states, Minnesota 47 and Tex-
42 See supra text accompanying note 27.
43 See supra text accompanying note 29.
44 But see Donnell v. Stogel, 560 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (enforc-
ing a contract betveen unmarried cohabitants who lived "together under the same
roof as man and wife for 4 years").
45 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 5, § 5.15.
46 See generally Katherine C. Gordon, Note, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabi-
tation Agreements: Wien Strings Will Attach and How to Prevent Them-A State Survey, 37
BRANDEIS Lj. 245 (1998-1999); George L. Blum, Annotation, Property Rights Arising
from Relationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 69 A.L.R.Sth 219 (1999) (noting
that states not recognizing the putative marriage doctrine formulate various methods
for property distribution after dissolution).
47 MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (1998) (originally enacted in 1980). In the first re-
ported case to deal with the statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the pro-
bate court's imposition of a constructive trust on a one-half interest in a home
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as,48 now deny enforcement of agreements between nonmarital co-
habitants regarding property and financial arrangements that are not
in writing. The Minnesota legislature also stripped its courts ofjuris-
diction over any claim rooted in cohabitation, absent a written agree-
ment.4 9 Texas took the simpler course of extending the requirement
in its Statute of Frauds of a writing for "an agreement made on consid-
eration of marriage" to apply as well to such an agreement made "on
consideration of nonmarital conjugal cohabitation."50
Courts in Florida and North Dakota have reached similar conclu-
sions.5 1 The Florida Appellate Court stated that the Statute of Frauds
applied to agreements for support between unmarried adults because
of "the potential abuse in marital-type relationships."5 2 New York only
enforces express agreements (either oral or written), 3 And Illinois
denies enforcement altogether to cohabitation agreements."
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania provided additional
support for private ordering by prospective spouses in Sineone v. Sime-
purchased with the joint funds of the cohabitants but with title taken in the name of
the decedent, reasoning that the statute was not intended to apply wvhere rights were
asserted based on property "acquired for cash consideration wholly independent of
any service contract related to cohabitation." Estate of Eriksen, 337 NAV.2d 671, 674
(Minn. 1983). However, subsequent appellate decisions have often distinguished Er-
iksen and have applied the statute to bar cohabitants' claims not based on the contri-
bution of cash to the purchase of property. Se, e.g., Hollom v. Carey, 343 NA.2d
701, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see also Obert v. Dahl, 574 NA.2d 747, 749-50
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that subsequent cases from that court have distin-
guished or declined to apply Eriksen). The latest decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court reaffirms the conclusion in Eriksen that the statute does not bar claims of unjust
enrichment based on financial contributions to the purchase price of property. Se
Estate of Palmen, 588 N.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Minn. 1999) (en banc).
48 TEx. FA i. CODE ANN. § 1.108 (Vernon 1998). In what appears to be the only
reported case interpreting the statute, it was applied to deny an alleged same-sex part-
ner's claim for relief after seventeen years of cohabitation. See Zaremba %,. Clibum,
949 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. App. 1997). The statute is criticized in Buddy Brixey, Com-
ment, Texas Legislation on tMe Statute ofrFrauds in Palimony Suits: Is an Oral Contract W'orth
the Paper It's Written On', 25 Hous. L. RE-, 979, 980 (1988).
49 See MINN.7. STAT. § 513.076 (1998) (originally enacted in 1980). For comments
criticizing the statute, see Kim Kantorowicz, Comment, Contracts-Cohabitation in Min-
nesota: From Love to Contract-Public Polity Gone Awry in In Re Estate of Palmen, 588
N.W2d 493 (Minn. 2000), 26 WM. Mrrctrm. L RE%. 213 (1999); Mary L Knoblauch,
Minnesota's Cohabitation Statute, 2 LA,,w & INEQ. 335 (1984).
50 Zaremba, 949 S.W2d at 829.
51 See Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1997); Kohler v.
Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992).
52 Posik, 695 So. 2d at 762.
53 See Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1980).
54 See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Ill. 1979).
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one, limiting judicial review of premarital agreements to "[t] raditional
principles of contract law. . where contracts are procured through
fraud, misrepresentation, or duress" and rejecting any inquiry into the
reasonableness of the provision for a spouse 5 5 Last year, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision upholding a
waiver of spousal support in a premarital agreement, despite the legis-
lature's omission in its version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act (UPAA)5 6 of section 3(a) (4), which expressly authorizes the modi-
fication or elimination of such support.5 7 The court cited statutes or
decisions in forty-one states and the District of Columbia that permit
such waivers.58
B. The Movement from Status to Contract
The movement from status to contract was heralded by Sir Henry
Maine almost 135 years ago.59 More recently, Wolfgang Friedman has
asserted that in family law, "freedom of contract on the whole genu-
inely expresses social and economic liberation from traditional ine-
quality and immobility... it is still necessary for the law to dismantle
the remaining status fetters and to establish equality of legal capaci-
ties, of which freedom of contract is a significant expression." 60 How-
ard 0. Hunter noted that the contract approach supports the
intentions of the cohabitants, while the status approach imposes upon
them obligations which they sought to avoid. 61 Herma Hill Kay and
Carol Amyx also support in general terms giving cohabitants freedom
to structure the terms of their relationship, although they endorse ju-
dicial inquiries into the conduct of the parties as a basis for creating
rights and obligations. 62 They argue that the variety of familial rela-
tionships into which individuals are now entering should be legally
supported in order to extend "increased dignity.., to persons experi-
menting with new lifestyles." 63 And Twila Perry, although she does
not favor requiring cohabitation agreements to be in writing, also crit-
55 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
56 UNI?. PRMAmrr.A AcR mENT Aar, 9B U.LA. 369 (1987).
57 See Pendleton v. Fireman, 5 P.3d 839, 845-47 (Cal. 2000).
58 See id. at 845.
59 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LuW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HIsTORY
OF SOCIEwY AND ITs RELAnON TO MODERN TIMES 163-65 (London, Scribner 1861).
60 Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Some Reflections on Status and Freedom, in ESSAys IN JU-
RISPRUDENCE iN HONOR OF RoscoE POUND 222, 236 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1962).
61 Howard 0. Hunter, An Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage, and the Mere-
tricious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REv. 1039, 1095 (1978).
62 See Kay & Amyx, supra note 17, at 968-73.
Q3 Id. at 973.
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icized the status approach, because it fails to "preserve cohabitation as
an alternative to marriage."64
The movement from status to contract gained momentum from a
variety of sources. In 1970, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
limited judicial review of separation agreements,6 7 and the same dec-
ade brought path-breaking decisions in CaliforniaG6 and Florida,67 up-
holding terms of premarital agreements that undertook at the
beginning of a marriage to anticipate and determine the conse-
quences of divorce, rather than at its end. The UPAA, promulgated
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1983, undertook to
remove many barriers to enforcement of such agreementso and has
been adopted by over half of the states.69
To be sure, the movement from status to contract was not without
dissent, chiefly from academics.70 Among the most vehement is Pro-
fessor Grace Ganz Blumberg, one of the Reporters for the Pinciples.
Blumberg contends that cohabitation does not reflect a choice not to
marry but rather "just happens."7' She argues "that publicly created
status is a much more suitable vehicle for handling support and prop-
erty claims of unmarried and married cohabitants than is contract the-
ory,"72 reasoning that cohabitants are in an unequal bargaining
position because of the male's greater economic power.73 Her view,
reflected in somewhat modified form in the Principles, would attach
marital status, for purposes of maintenance and property division, to
cohabitants who have lived together for two or more years or for any
64 Perry, supra note 29, at 115.
65 See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AC § 306, 9A U.LA. 248-49 (1998).
66 See In reMarriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 333 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the view
that in order for an antenuptial agreement to be valid, the parties must contemplate a
lifelong marriage).
67 See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
68 See infra text accompanying notes 128-35.
69 See UNIF. PEawurrAL AGR. mFrT AC, 9B U.L.A. 89 (Supp. 2000).
70 Seesources cited infra note 80; see alsoJ. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudill, A
Reconnaissance of Public Policy Restrictions upon Enforcement of Contracts Bltween Cohabi-
tants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93, 98-106 (1984) (contending that a state's interest in ensuring
that spouses are left with adequate financial resources and in preventing spouses and
children from becoming wards of the state applies as well to protection of cohabi-
tants). They suggest that agreements between de facto spouses (couples who cohabit
for more than five years or have a child together) should be scrutinized in the same
manner as agreements between lawful spouses. Id. at 121.
71 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Mithout Marriage: A Different Perspcthe, 28
UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1135 (1981) (quotingJ. TROST, UNMMARRED COBrrATioN 63-W,4
(1979)).
72 Id. at 1163.
73 Id.
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time period if the couple had a child.74 She would even treat as mar-
riage "a stable cohabitation of any duration ending in the death of
one of the parties" for purposes of intestacy and elective share
statutes. 7
5
Professor Blumberg's unsupported assertion that prospective co-
habitants cannot readily find another person to bargain with76 reflects
a particular view of social reality. Undoubtedly, she is correct in as-
suming that some cohabitants do not feel free to leave an unsatisfac-
tory relationship or to seek by bargaining to improve it. But surely
there are others who are not similarly inhibited and who express their
dissatisfaction with a relationship either by bargaining or by moving
on to another partner. Nor does Blumberg address the possibility that
treating cohabitation as if it were marriage may inhibit the develop-
ment of relationships that could enrich both cohabitants' lives and
that might evolve into marriage. Thus, the question for policy makers
is whether protection of the interests of cohabitants in the first group
is more important than freeing other cohabitants to structure their
relationships to meet their individual needs.
II. COHABrrATION AGREEMENTS UNDER THE PRINCIPLES
A. The Principles' Imposition of Domestic Partnership Status
When it undertook to expand its statement of the Principles of
Family Dissolution to include unmarried cohabitants, the ALI had a
unique opportunity to respond to a widely felt need for greater cer-
tainty and predictability in an increasingly important area of private
ordering. The Marvin court admitted that its "past decisions hover
over the issue in the somewhat wispy form of the figures of a Chagall
painting. '77 Although the decision dispelled doubts as to the capacity
of cohabitants in California to contract with each other, persisting un-
certainties remain with respect to the willingness of courts there and
elsewhere to revise or imply contracts to reflect judicial perceptions of
fairness. 78
Suggested forms for nonmarital cohabitation agreements often
contain caveats about the unsettled state of the law in this area.79
Even if the parties enter into their relationship in a state such as Min-
74 Id. at 1166.
75 Id. at 1167.
76 Id. at 1163.
77 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal. 1976).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
79 See, e.g., 2 ALEXANDER LnDEY & Louis I. PARLEY, LINDEY AND PARLEY ON SEl'IAw
"nON AGREEMENTS AND ANrENUTIAL CoNTRATS § 100.02 (2d ed. 2000).
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nesota or Texas that requires a writing to create enforceable obliga-
tions based on nonmarital cohabitation, they may move to another
state where no writing is required. If suit is brought in that state, it
may apply its law, rather than that of the place where cohabitation
commenced, and grant enforcement of an alleged express or implied
agreement or other equitable relief despite the absence of a writing.
Instead of responding to these concerns and facilitating enforce-
ment of agreements between nonmarital partners, the Principles
march resolutely backward to status-based law. 80 If cohabitants share
a primary residence and life together as a couple for three years (two
years if they have a common child), the Principles would treat termina-
tion of the relationship as if it were the dissolution of a marriage, rea-
soning that "their course of conduct over a period of years subjects
them to parallel rules."81
It is technically correct, of course, that "the recognition of inter
se claims of domestic partners does not revive the doctrine of com-
mon-law marriage,"8 2 as a state's enactment of Chapter 6 would not
affect relations between the partners and either third parties or gov-
ernmental bodies. Nevertheless, the Principles" recognition of domes-
tic partners would substitute an emphasis on status, very similar to
common-law marriage, for the powerful contemporary movement to
recognize the parties' freedom to contract about the terms of their
relationship. And it would inject a troubling degree of uncertainty
into the determination of when domestic partnership status exists.
B. Uncertainty as to Mien Donestic Partnership Status Evists
Even if neither the three-year nor the two-year test is satisfied, a
cohabitant may nevertheless qualify for the full array of benefits pro-
vided on dissolution for qualifying marital partners by proving that
the parties shared a primary residence for a significant period and
lived together as a couple.83 That determination is to be made by
reference to "all the circumstances," including, inter alia, "(e) [t]he
80 In exalting status in this context, the ALI is by no means alone. See Blumberg,
supra note 71, at 1128; David S. Caudill, Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation: A
Proposal to Update and Reconsider Common-Law Marriag, 49 TENNi. L Rrx. 537, 556-59
(1982); H.Jay Folberg & William P. Buren, Domestic Partnership: A PtoposalforDividing
the Property of Unmarried Familes, 12 W .I.ErrE L REv. 453, 479-84 (1976); William
A. ReppyJr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating
a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REv. 1677, 1677 (1984).
81 ALl Pr mciPL.Es (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 6.03. For the suggested
time periods, see id. § 6.03, cmt. d.
82 Id. § 6.01 cmt. a.
83 Id. § 6.03(6).
20011 1479
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
extent to which the relationship wrought change in the life of either
or both parties; [and] ... (h) [t]he emotional or physical intimacy of
the parties' relationship ....
Comment b to section 6.02 is likewise accurate in denying that
the chapter seeks or is likely to encourage nonmarital relationships as
an alternative to marriage, as the Principles would make economic con-
sequences the same in each case.85 What the Principles exempt from
such treatment, and thus implicitly favor, are relationships that do not
satisfy the threshold requirement that the parties share a primary resi-
dence. Thus, cohabitants who wish to avoid the burdensome financial
consequences of domestic partnership under the Principles should ei-
ther maintain separate primary residences, change partners at fre-
quent intervals, or limit those consequences by agreement.
III. TiH PRINcipLS' IMPEDIMENTS TO CONTRACTING OUT OF
DoMESTIc PARTNERSHIP STATUS
The barriers that the Principles would erect to enforcement of
agreements between domestic partners, as well as premarital and mar-
ital agreements, are based chiefly on aspects of the contract doctrines
of duress and unconscionability:s 6 (1) procedural defects in the bar-
gaining process, including unfair negotiating tactics; (2) substantive
defects, or "a gross one-sidedness in terms."87
Section 6.01(2) requires agreements between domestic partners
to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 7,88 which generally is couched
in language applicable to premarital agreements, although some spe-
cific references reflect inherent differences in the two dnds of
agreements.
The following discussion will contrast the Principles impediments
to enforcement of both kinds of agreements with the less restrictive
requirements embodied in the UPAA.8 9
A. Procedural Requirements
Before undertaking to analyze the burdens that section 7.05
would impose on a party seeking enforcement of a premarital agree-
meni or an agreement between domestic partners, it is important to
contrast the situations of the parties to the two types of agreements.
84 Id. § 6.03(7) (e), (h).
85 See id. § 6.02 cmt. b.
86 Id. § 7.01 cmt. a.
87 Id. § 7.01 cmt. d.
88 See id. § 6.01(2).
89 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr, 9B U.LA. 369 (1987).
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In marriage (excluding common-law marriages in the minority of
states that recognize them-less than one-fourthg0), the legal relation-
ship has a clear starting date with the wedding, whether it is a large
social event or an informal ceremony before ajustice of the peace. In
contrast, cohabitation may have no clear starting point. One com-
mentator has asserted:
Most cohabitation evolves from a drift into sleeping more and more
frequently together and a gradual accumulation of possessions at
one residence. If and when a decision with conscious deliberation
is made, it is usually precipitated by some external force, such as the
end of the term, graduation, a change ofjob, a need for housing, or
reduced income.9 1
At present, a more important difference between termination of
marriage and of cohabitation is that state law is quite explicit as to the
legal consequences of the former, in the absence of an enforceable
premarital agreement, even though the precise contours of the prop-
erty and support rights of a former spouse usually are determined by
the exercise ofjudicial discretion. In contrast, in only a few states may
certain acquisitions during some cohabitations be divided, in the
court's discretion, when the relationship ends.92 In other states, the
financial consequences that follow termination of such a relationship
are even less predictable. They depend both on the willingness of a
court to apply the principles of Marvin to give effect to an express or
implied contract of the parties or to grant other equitable relief and
the manner in which such principles are applied. Thus parties to a
premarital agreement contract in the light of an explicit default rule,
whereas contracting domestic partners in the great majority of states
generally do not, unless the state adopts Chapter 6 or some
counterpart.
Section 7.05 creates three procedural hurdles for a party seeking
enforcement of premarital and marital agreements, as well as agree-
ments between domestic partners, none of which are found in the
UPAA.93
(1) Under section 7.05(2), the party seeking enforcement bears
the burden of proving that the other party's consent was informed
and not obtained under duress.94 In contrast, section 6 of the UPAA
90 For a list, see IRA MARK ELwT-AN ET A.., FA uLy LA%% CASES, TFAxT, PROnF.its
65-66 (3d ed. 1998).
91 Eleanor D. Macklin, Nonmarital Heterosexual Coiabitalion, MimmGE & F.t.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 1, 6, quoted in Blumberg, supra note 71, at 1135 n.70.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
93 ALl PRtNCiP.Es (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.05.
94 See id. § 7.05(2).
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requires the party resisting enforcement to prove either lack of volun-
tary execution or unconscionability.
(2) In order to enjoy the benefit of a rebuttable presumption
that the requirements of informed consent and freedom from duress
are satisfied, under section 7.05(3) the party seeking enforcement
must prove (a) that the agreement "was executed at least 30 days
before the parties' marriage;" (b) "both parties were advised to obtain
independent legal counsel, and had reasonable opportunity to do
so . . ."; and (c)
in the case of agreeme its concluded Without... [such] counsel for
each party, the agreement states, in language easily understandable
by an adult of ordinary intelligence with no legal training,
(i) the nature of any rights or claims... altered... and the
nature of that alteration, and
(ii) that the interest of the spouses... may be adverse. 95
(3) Finally, section 7.05(5) requires a party, in order "[t]o en-
force terms that limit claims . . . to compensatory payments, or to
share in marital property, [to] ... show that.., the other party knew,
at least approximately, [his] assets and income ... ."96 Under UPAA
section 6(a), the burden is on the party resisting enforcement to
prove nondisclosure of assets and no waiver of disclosure.97
For agreements between domestic partners, there is no analog to
the requirement that a premarital agreement be executed at least
thirty days before the parties' marriage. Instead, either party can re-
scind within thirty days of execution of the agreementY
1. Proving Informed Consentand Absence of Duress
Comment b acknowledges that the usual contract rules place the
burden of proving duress on the party challenging the agreement and
do not require the other party to prove that his consent was "in-
formed."99 The Principles give two reasons for shifting the burden for
both prospective spouses and nonmarital cohabitants in these matters:
(1) "[m]ost parties contemplating marriage focus their attention on
the life they anticipate sharing with their intended spouse, not on i-
nancial aspects of a marital dissolution they do not expect to occur,"
95 Id. § 7.05(3)(a)-(c).
96 Id. § 7.05(5).
97 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6(a) (2), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
98 ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.05(4).
99 Id. § 7.05 cmL b.
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and'00 (2) "premarital agreements typically alter claims the parties
would otherwise have on one another under applicable law .... "101
In the case of either kind of agreement, the reasons given for
shifting the burden of proof are equally unpersuasive. Whaile the party
against whom enforcement is sought may have been focusing on other
matters when the agreement was signed, that factor does not keep his
consent from being "informed" norjustify placing the burden of prov-
ing that it was informed on the other party. And to assert that the
agreement alters claims the parties would othenise have made neces-
sarily assumes that cohabitation or marriage would take place whether
or not the agreement was signed. In many litigated cases, it seems
quite likely that without the premarital agreement there would have
been no marriage and, hence, no claims to be altered, except as a
domestic partner. Indeed, the spouse resisting enforcement does so
in part on the ground of alleged duress resulting from the refusal of
the other spouse to proceed with the marriage, unless the agreement
was signed. 10 2 And if the Principles became law in a given jurisdiction,
cohabitants whose partners refuse to sign an agreement may choose
to end the relationship before the time period required to create legal
obligations has passed. Thus again, the agreement does not alter obli-
gations the parties would otherwise have.
Whether the second statement applies to domestic partners is
open to debate. As the preceding discussion brought out, the claims
that domestic partners have on termination of a relationship usually
are unclear, depending on the willingness of a court to apply the prin-
ciples laid down in Marvin, as well as the manner in which the court
does so. Thus, it is difficult to say exactly what claims are altered by a
domestic partnership agreement, 03 although of course legislative or
judicial adoption of the Principles would change this.
The "plain language" requirement of section 7.05 (3) (c)'io would
create a trap for any proponent so ill-advised as to fail to afford the
other party opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel.10° Of
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., In reMarriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 316-18 (Iowa 1996); Sime-
one v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
103 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
104 ALI PRINcwLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.05(3)(c).
105 In many cases, a "plain language" requirement would be extremely difficut to
satisfy. The ALI provides an illustration which purports to do so in the relatively sim-
ple situation in which the agreement undertakes merely to make clear that no marital
property rights will arise from the marriage. Sce id. § 7.05 cmt. f, illus. 10. However,
this illustration 10 fails to reflect section 4.05(1), under which a portion of any in-
crease in the value of separate property is divisible on divorce "whenever either
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course it may be a foregone conclusion that concerns about possible
liability for malpractice are highly likely to lead counsel to routinely
advise the party whose rights would be diminished not to sign the
agreement. It is somewhat puzzling, however, that, read literally, the
section provides that the party against whom enforcement is sought
could resist application of the rebuttable presumption of informed
consent on the ground that the proponent did not have the opportu-
nity to obtain independent counsel. 06 A rebuttable presumption that
this requirement has been satisfied arises when the party seeking en-
forcement shows that "both parties were advised to obtain indepen-
dent legal counsel, and had reasonable opportunity to do so, before
the agreement's execution."10 7 Thus, if the party seel~ing enforce-
ment did not obtain or have a reasonable opportunity to obtain inde-
pendent legal counsel, the rebuttable presumption does not arise.
2. Disclosure of Assets and Income
The requirement in section 7.05 (5) that the proponent show that
the other party knew his approximate assets and income is seriously
objectionable if, as plainly appears, it is intended to be nonwaiv-
able.'08 Section 7.05(5) purports to create a safe harbor in satisfying
the disclosure requirement by a showing that
prior to signing the agreement the party seeking to enforce it pro-
vided the other party with a written statement accurately listing
spouse has devoted substantial time during marriage to the property's management
or preservation." ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 5,
§ 4.05(1). And the suggestion that the lawyer might add language explaining that
inherited property is not usually divided "[i]f relevant to the parties' situation," ALl
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.05 cmt. f, illus. 10, is puzzling for
two reasons. First, it is directly contradicted by section 4.18, which gradually converts
separate property into marital property, including property inherited during mar-
riage. ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 5, § 4.18. Second,
there is no guidance as to when an explanation with reference to inherited property is
"relevant." How can the drafter anticipate the possibility of inheritance by either
spouse, and if so, on what basis? And a "plain English" statement explaining a waiver
of the right to compensatory payments on dissolution under all five headings in chap-
ter 5 would be next to impossible to draft. Thus, the net effect of the "plain English"
requirement is to cast serious doubt on the validity of almost every agreement drafted
without independent legal counsel for each party.
106 Under section 7.05(2), the party seeking enforcement "must show that the
other party's consent to it was informed and not obtained under duress." ALI PRINCI.
PLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.05(2).
107 Id. § 7.05(3) (b) (emphasis added).
108 See id. § 7.05(5).
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(i) his or her significant assets, and their total approximate mar-
ket value;
(ii) his or her approximate annual income for each of the preced-
ing three years; and
(iii) any significant future acquisitions, or changes in income, to
which the party has a current legal entitlement, or which the
party reasonably expects to realize within three years of the
agreement's execution.10 9
However, recent stock market turbulence and the rapidly chang-
ing prospects of new business ventures underscores the difficulty in
either determining the "approximate market value" of restricted
stock, which lacks such a market, or predicting the future income of
an executive whose fortunes are linked to a small business. Viewed
with the omniscience of hindsight, the most conscientious attempt at
disclosure in these cases may be deemed inadequate.
Comment gseeks tojustify the Principles' intrusive requirement of
disclosure of assets by asserting, inaccurately, that it "is nearly univer-
sal under existing law,"" 0 citing UPAA section 6(a), but omitting any
reference to section 6(a) (2) (ii), which expressly authorizes disclosure
to be waived. The reasons for recognizing such a waiver were persua-
sively stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Stregac v. Moldofskv, up-
holding an express legislative negation of a disclosure requirement in
order for a premarital agreement to be valid in probate."1 "Many
older Florida residents want to marry again but also want to keep their
assets separate .... [The statute] allows complete control over assets
accumulated over a lifetime without fear that a partial disclosure
before marriage may trigger an unwanted disposition of those
assets."112
B. Substantive Requirements for an Enforceable Agreement
Agreements that successfully surmount the rigorous procedural
hurdles in section 7.05 may still be subject to intrusive substantive re-
view under section 7.07.11 That section directs the court to deny en-
forcement of a term in an agreement if its enforcement would "work a
substantial injustice within the meaning of this section,"'1 4 which, like
any invocation of "fairness" as a basis for decision, has intuitive ap-
109 Id.
110 I § 7.05 cmt. g.
111 474 So. 2d 206, 207 (Fla. 1985).
112 Id.
113 ALl Pmxcn ' s (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.07.
114 Id. § 7.07(1).
14852001]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
peal. 115 However, section 7.07(2) paints the circumstances under
which a court should consider denying enforcement on this ground
with an extremely broad brush.
Either of the following events would trigger that review: (1) pas-
sage of more than a fixed number of yearsl" 6 (comment b suggests
"about 10"); 117 or (2) birth or adoption of a child by the parties, if
they had no children in common when the agreement was
executed."18
In addition, section 7.07(2) (c) provides a breathtakingly broad
catch-all basis for intrusive judicial review, if it has not already been set
in motion by (1) or (2):
the circumstances have changed, the change is significant in evalu-
ating the impact of the agreement on the parties or their children,
and it is likely that individuals would be unable, at the time of exe-
cution, to anticipate the new circumstances, or their impact upon
the individual's evaluation of the agreement's terms.119
In attempting to justify the remarkable constraints section 7.07(2) (c)
would place on individuals structuring their relationships, the Princi-
pes asserts that people make mistakes in evaluating information and
in underestimating risks of adverse developments and that these fac-
tors may be particularly likely to be present when a premarital agree-
ment is signed. 120 Support for this conclusion is based on a survey of
recent applicants for a marriage license who had not previously been
married. 121 Not surprisingly, the median response estimated correctly
that fifty percent of American marriages would end in divorce, but
predicted that the chance that the respondent's own marriage would
end in divorce was zero. 12 2 The respondents' optimism extended as
well to the consequences of divorce in their own cases, as compared to
the general population, as to obtaining custody of children, to secur-
ing alimony if they requested it, and to compliance by their spouse
with court orders with respect to alimony and child support. 123
115 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
116 ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.07(2) (a).
117 Id. § 7.07 cmt. b.
118 Id. § 7.07(2)(b).
119 Id. § 7.07(2) (c).
120 See id. § 7.07 cmt. b.
121 See id. § 7.07 Reporter's Notes cmt. b (citing Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Eveiy Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time
of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 439 (1993)).
122 See ALl PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.07 cmt. b.
123 Id.
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There are at least two responses to the Principles' contention that
the cognitive dissonance of engaged couples blinds them to the risk
that their marriage will end in divorce and hence leads them to give
less attention to a proposed premarital agreement than its potential
importance warrants. Professor Kip Viscusi has provided the first ith
respect to "optimism bias" and "cognitive dissonance" in the context
of warnings to consumers. "Much of the source of the apparent opti-
mism bias may be a result of the framing of the risk question ... in
effect ask[ing] people to find fault with themselves, something that
most people are unwilling to do."124
Viscusi points out that people's actions, in relation to riskyjobs
and hazardous products, are consistent with a much greater aw re-
ness-indeed, in some instances, a substantial overvaluation of the de-
crease in risk from buying safer products-than their responses to
questions that invite them to find fault with themselves.'2 If Viscusi's
insight into the effect of different ways of framing the question were
applied to a survey of engaged couples or prospective domestic part-
ners, they might be asked not to assess the risk that their relationship
might fail, which in effect asks them to find fault with themselves, but
rather, to assess what premium they would pay for a large insurance
policy to cover the financial and emotional losses of divorce or termi-
nation of the domestic partnership. A fiancee's or partner's willing-
ness to pay a substantial premium for such protection would be a far
better indication of how she assesses the risk that her relationship
might end than questions that require her to find fault with herself by
acknowledging that her choice of partner may be a mistake.
A second weakness in the Priniples' reliance on cognitive disso-
nance of engaged couples lies in the characteristics of the group. The
most appropriate group for the study should not include all appli-
cants for marriage licenses, but rather only those who have been asked
by their prospective spouses to sign a premarital agreement dealing
with the consequences of divorce. Such a request surely signals some
doubt by the proponent of the agreement about the success of the
marriage, and an extraordinary degree of cognitive dissonance would
be required in order for the prospective partner to ignore that signal.
Although there appears to be no published results of any comparable
survey of cohabitants, it seems intuitively likely that they would be
even more inclined than prospective spouses to recognize the very
real possibility that the relationship might not last.
124 W. Kip Viscusi, Using Warnings to Extend the Boundaries of Consuner Soverdagt, 23
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 211, 226-28 (1999).
125 See id. at 218-28.
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More fundamentally, the ALI does not fully explore the possible
adverse consequences of making enforcement of premarital agree-
ments substantially more difficult and unpredictable than it is today in
the states that have adopted the UPAA and in others, such as Penn-
sylvania, 126 where enforcement is more likely to be the rule than the
exception. If prospective spouses know that chances for enforcement
of a proposed agreement are uncertain, the marriage may not take
place, even though both parties are convinced that marriage on the
proposed terms would make them happier than not marrying. The
same reasoning is equally applicable to potential domestic partners,
Comment b also seeks to justify strict scrutiny of premarital agree-
ments by characterizing them as having no immediate consequences.
In order for this statement to be accurate, the permissible scope of
such agreements could not include, as it does under UPAA subsec-
tions 3(a) (1) and (2), ownership and control of property during mar-
riage.' 27 The Principles neither acknowledge nor undertake to
rationalize this limitation.
In contrast to the Principles' intrusive substantive review, the re-
view provided by UPAA section 6(a) (2) does not treat unconscionabil-
ity, without more, as a defense to enforcement of an agreement. In
addition to proving unconscionability, the party resisting enforcement
must show that she
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the prop-
erty or financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) did not voluntarily... Waive ... any right to disclosure ...
beyond [that] provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other
party.' 28
Moreover, section 6(a) (2) makes explicit that unconscionability
is tested at the time of execution, and the comment to this section
states that "a premarital agreement is enforceable if enforcement
would not have been unconscionable at the time the agreement was
executed."' 29 Despite this seemingly clear language, the Reporter's
Note to section 7.07 of the Principles states that the official comment is
confusing as to whether unconscionabiliy should be determined at the
time of the agreement or when enforcement is sought.' 30
126 See supra text accompanying note 55.
127 See UNWF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987).
128 UNtF. PREMAIuTAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6(a) (2), 9B U.LA. 376 (1987).
129 Id. § 6 cmt. (citations omitted).
130 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 2, § 7.07, Reporter's
Note cmt. b. The "confusion" is said to stem from two sources. First is the citation in
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The legislative history of the UPAA dearly establishes that the
time of execution is controlling. The debate over unconscionability at
the meeting on the UPAA of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws was spirited, and motions similar to the
ALI's treatment of unconscionability were made. One committee
member proposed adding the following language: "A premarital
agreement is not enforceable to the extent that enforcement would
be unconscionable at the time of enforcement unless the party against
whom enforcement is sought had the advice of legal counsel at the
time the agreement was executed."' 31 The proposal was rejected by a
voice vote.'3 2 Later in the proceedings, "a sense of the house motion
that unconscionable agreements cannot be enforced, even if notice
has been given to the other party," was proposed and defeated. 33
The reason that the committee resisted expanding unconsciona-
bility was clearly stated by one of the commissioners.
This is an area of the law where there is a great deal of uncertainty
at the present time with respect to enforceability, and it's one that is
most troublesome to practitioners in the domestic relations
field .... I can say the situation in Arkansas is that you never know
whether or not the court is going to decide that the agreement was
unconscionable, without regard to any of these other factors. There
may have been disclosure, full knowledge, but the court states at a
later date that it was unconscionable. Even though you say that they
should decide it at the time the agreement was made, they decide it
at the time when it is before them.
We think that we have got protection in the other elements,
and that you shouldn't be leaving that gate open, that it can always
be argued that in spite of everything you did, all the disclosure you
made-the court suddenly ten years later decides that it was
unconscionable.
the UPAA's comment to section six to a case in which unconscionability was tested at
the time of dissolution of the marriage. Second is the quotation, in the same com-
ment, of section 306 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which states that "the
court may look to the economic circumstances of the parties resulting from the agree-
ment" UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AC § 306 cmL, 9A U.LA. 250 (1998), quoted in
UNto. PaRFxiArrAL AGPREEMrE AC § 6 cmt., 9B U.LA. 377 (1987). However, as the
reporter notes, this language refers to separation agreements and is therefore irrele-
vant to a discussion of premarital agreements. See ALI PmiNcL.Es (Tentative Draft
2000), supra note 2, § 7.07 Reporter's Note cmt. b. To find confusion in this context
is to exalt one of the many cases cited in the comment to UPAA section six and a
clearly inappropriate quotation over the explicit language of the provision and
comment.
131 UIqr. ANTENuPL AGRE. mms AC 62 (July 23, 25-26, 1983).
132 Id. at 63.
133 Id. at 80.
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That's what we are trying to avoid. We're trying to put in an
element of certainty and actual protection, to a maximum
degree.134
Similar reasoning should inform the treatment of agreements be-
tween domestic partners.
CONCLUSION
The Principles reflect policies favored by a small group of legal
academics, rather than the mainstream of developing American law
governing cohabitants. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and state legislatures should respond to the
widely felt need for greater certainty and predictability in this area by
specifying the circumstances under which cohabitants have claims
against each other when their relationship ends and the manner in
which such claims can be modified or eliminated. For example, com-
pensation may be appropriate for a cohabitant who pays for education
or training of the other party.I35 Whether the UPAA is an appropriate
instrument for this purpose and whether any revisions in the Act are
appropriate in the light of almost two decades experience with it are
questions for another day.
134 Id. at 70.
135 See supra text accompanying note 45.
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